Kenneth Oye: "The conditions for cooperation in world politics"
Oye uses game theory to explain the value of cooperation in international relations as a practical decision-making system that takes into account the future of relations.
Payoff Structure:
There are three games in which cooperation is an option: Chicken, Stag Hunt, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Payoff structure affects the significance of cooperation to create mutual benefits. In iterated games, the payoff gains more significance because the players must have take future games into account. Payoff structure can be changed by unilateral decisions like building up arms, bilateral bargaining to form issue linkage, multilateral strategies to generate new norms and alter states' understanding of the others' interests.
Single Play and Iterated Games:
Iteration increases the likelihood of cooperation because single-play results in the the desire to defect because there are no negative consequences but because defection decreases the possibility of future cooperation, players will be unlikely to defect when they know they will have to repeat the game in the future. Reciprocity defines the payoff in iterated games because present cooperation promises the response of future cooperation where as present defection poses the threat of the response of future defection, encouraging mutual cooperation.
Number of Players:
As the number of players increases, the cost of transactions and information rises because identifying actors and controlling the situation becomes more difficult in increasingly complicated situations. Differentiating the actors and outcomes becomes more complex as the number of players increases, as does the likelihood of independent action, particularly of defection. Reciprocity becomes difficult because defection poses an even greater threat to the rest of the players. Conditional or sanctioned defection will spread defection. However, regime creation and collective enforcement can combat this tendency in a growing game.
Conclusion: While the tendency to defect increases as the number of players increases in a multilateral system, the shadow of the future, changes in the payoff structure to make cooperation more desirable, and the encouragement of international regimes can reinforce the mutual benefits of cooperation.
Payoff Structure:
There are three games in which cooperation is an option: Chicken, Stag Hunt, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Payoff structure affects the significance of cooperation to create mutual benefits. In iterated games, the payoff gains more significance because the players must have take future games into account. Payoff structure can be changed by unilateral decisions like building up arms, bilateral bargaining to form issue linkage, multilateral strategies to generate new norms and alter states' understanding of the others' interests.
Single Play and Iterated Games:
Iteration increases the likelihood of cooperation because single-play results in the the desire to defect because there are no negative consequences but because defection decreases the possibility of future cooperation, players will be unlikely to defect when they know they will have to repeat the game in the future. Reciprocity defines the payoff in iterated games because present cooperation promises the response of future cooperation where as present defection poses the threat of the response of future defection, encouraging mutual cooperation.
Number of Players:
As the number of players increases, the cost of transactions and information rises because identifying actors and controlling the situation becomes more difficult in increasingly complicated situations. Differentiating the actors and outcomes becomes more complex as the number of players increases, as does the likelihood of independent action, particularly of defection. Reciprocity becomes difficult because defection poses an even greater threat to the rest of the players. Conditional or sanctioned defection will spread defection. However, regime creation and collective enforcement can combat this tendency in a growing game.
Conclusion: While the tendency to defect increases as the number of players increases in a multilateral system, the shadow of the future, changes in the payoff structure to make cooperation more desirable, and the encouragement of international regimes can reinforce the mutual benefits of cooperation.